Why Annual Fertiliser Sharing Will Not Solve Nigeria’s Food Problem

Questions answered in this article:

— Why does Nigeria continue to rely on fertiliser distribution programmes to address food insecurity?

— Why are fertiliser subsidy programmes failing to deliver sustainable improvements in food production?

— What alternative strategies can Nigeria adopt to improve agricultural productivity, farmer incomes, and long-term food security?

At the beginning of every planting season, a familiar ritual unfolds across Nigeria. Pictures, videos and reports of fertiliser being distributed to farmers flood newspapers, broadcast media and social media. 

Government representatives, politicians and beneficiaries declare that this season's distribution will finally tip the country toward food self-sufficiency.

It has become an all-too-familiar routine that we must evaluate for its actual impact on food security and cost-effectiveness.

A Programme with Remarkable Reach

In 2026 alone, perhaps because the government pledged to fix the food crisis, thousands of tonnes of fertiliser have been reportedly shared. 

The National Agricultural Development Fund (NADF), under the Renewed Hope Farm Input Support Programme (FISP), has been rolling out subsidised fertiliser zone by zone: 100,800 bags to 25,200 farmers across Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi and Jigawa in the North-West; 80,640 bags each to smallholders in the South-West.  

According to Vice President Kashim Shettima, during the launch, NADF's nationwide target is to share 515,720 bags of UREA and NPK fertilisers to 128,930 smallholder farmers in the country.

States and regional sharing also run parallel with FG's interventions. In Kano, Governor Yusuf claimed to have distributed 150 truckloads of fertiliser to farmers across 44 LGAs in the state after Kano North's Senator Barau Jibrin had earlier organised an annual distribution of over 53,000 bags across thirteen local government areas, with beneficiaries including not just farmers but party stakeholders, ward heads, and even social media influencers.

Kwara's Senator Saliu Mustapha also reportedly handed out 5,000 bags of NPK and 2,500 bags of urea worth roughly ₦1.5 billion to farmer associations in his senatorial district. Ebonyi's Rt. Hon. Chinedu Ogah distributed 5,000 bags alongside cash support ahead of the planting season, and Oyo's Hon. Aderemi Oseni also reached over 7,000 farmers with fertiliser and equipment.

Each of these events follows a near-identical script: a flag-off ceremony, a representative praising the intervention, and grateful farmers. Beyond supporting food production efforts, fertiliser distribution seems to have become a tool of constituency politics.

A Genuine Case for the Approach

Before headlining its weaknesses, it is important to understand that the underlying logic behind sharing fertilisers is actually not baseless.

Fertiliser is a proven yield-enhancing input, and its high cost reduces its usage across the country compared to global rates. When fertiliser becomes expensive, farmers cut application rates or shrink cultivated area, which directly impacts national food production. 

Experts and past reviews have established that farmers’ access to fertiliser improved when the government took control of procurement and distribution. It also significantly improved yields across major staples in past decades.

However, the cost-effectiveness and sustainability have not been positive. The political durability of this model appears to be a stronger incentive for political players to choose this intervention approach.

Fertiliser support delivers visible, immediate, easily distributed benefits, which is popular in Nigeria. This reason is likely why it survives budget cycle after budget cycle even where more transformative alternatives exist. 

The Photo-ops and legacy claims serve as the figures behind every edition of another incentive. Consider that the Renewed Hope Fertiliser Support Programme alone could make up 94.7% of NADF's 2026 proposed capital budget.

But the more important question is: who is gaining and at whose cost? 

Where the Strategy Falls Apart 

Reviews going back over a decade identify the same recurring failure points. The trouble starts with comparing the value delivered to the money spent. 

One review of Nigeria's fertiliser subsidy history concluded that despite the substantial resources committed over the years, the desired results have consistently fallen short. It attributes this failure to policy inconsistency, weak political will among implementers, and an overly restricted role for the private sector.

Despite several generations of fertiliser subsidy schemes and interventions in Nigeria, the set goals have still not been definitively achieved. Access to fertiliser among Nigerian farmers may have increased, but it is still not reaching farmers who need it. Fertiliser use still remains low, well below the Abuja Declaration target, and the ultimate food self-sufficiency is not near reach.

Reports and politicisation of sharing and outright fraud in the distribution of these fertilisers have never been disproved. A recent ActionAid assessment of a related federal input scheme, the wheat component of the National Agricultural Growth Scheme-Agro Pocket (NAGS-AP), raises delivery-level concerns that likely generalise across similar programmes. The report called for sanctions against agro-dealers found guilty of malpractice, greater farmer awareness of programme processes, and stronger state-level extension services. It implicitly acknowledges that mismanagement and information gaps undermine even well-designed input interventions on the ground.

In addition, farmers’ problems go beyond just a lack of input. The serious insecurity crisis has forced several farmers in the country’s core food production belt to flee their farms and homes. Other challenges include inadequate technical extension support and a lack of accessible, affordable storage and distribution facilities, which contribute to the annual gross post-harvest losses. 

There are also climate change-induced problems of irregular weather patterns that cause floods, drought, and heat strokes that seriously affect cultivation and crop yields

What it Means for Farmers and National Food Security Goals

The consequences fall hardest on the smallholders the programme claims to serve. 

When one input dominates budget lines and delivery infrastructure has gaps, only a fraction of registered farmers nationwide receive support in any given season. Everyone else pays market prices influenced by FX pressure and import dependency.

Farmers who receive subsidised inputs but no accompanying credit, storage, or market access support only gain a temporary cost break without addressing the deeper income instability that plagues them. 

Consequently, food inflation keeps climbing because farmers continue to struggle with other production, harvesting, processing and delivery issues. 

This evidently shows that a strategy measured in bags distributed and photo-ops held is not the same as a strategy measured in farmer income, resilience, or national food security outcomes.

The Case for a Rethink

While it is unwise to stop providing input support for farmers, it is pertinent to stop focusing only on fertiliser distribution. 

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) review of subsidy alternatives established that sharing fertiliser packages alone underperforms in the face of poor soils and unirrigated farmlands, which are prone to climate shocks. Weak crop markets also undermine the incentive to invest even when inputs are cheap, and government-led procurement can crowd out the private input markets Nigeria farmers need long-term.

Four recommended alternatives:

Digital extension services have already shown results domestically; personalised digital advisory delivery increased farmer profits by 10 per cent in Nigeria specifically. 

Subsidised soil testing paired with tailored input vouchers, as piloted in Tanzania, nearly doubled fertiliser application and substantially lifted yields by matching input to actual soil need rather than distributing identical bags to every farmer. 

Farmer-led, small-scale irrigation, shallow tube wells already improving year-round production in Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto, offers climate resilience that a seasonal fertiliser bag simply cannot. 

Investment in cold chain and storage addresses a failure point entirely outside the input conversation. Nigeria loses between ₦3.5 trillion and ₦5 trillion in produce annually to post-harvest inefficiencies, with one industry expert bluntly framing it as a preservation problem rather than a production shortfall. Cold storage alone has been shown to cut post-harvest loss by as much as 83 per cent and lift farmer income by half.

Feasibility and the Obstacles Ahead

None of these alternatives is a simple swap-in. Extension services and soil testing require a trained workforce and a functioning farmer registry. 

NADF is building a 1,800-strong Extension Advisory Worker department, a genuine step in the right direction, but will need sustained funding beyond a single farming season to matter.

Farmer-led irrigation needs long-run infrastructure finance that Nigeria's short-cycle agricultural lending isn't built to provide. While rural insurance products already exist, there is low farmer awareness and trust. These factors limit uptake and indicate that support matters as much as product design.

Cold chain investment is capital-intensive and power-hungry in a country where most of the population lacks reliable electricity. Solar-powered cold storage is already being proposed as a workaround suited to smallholder contexts. 

The realistic path is not to defund fertiliser distribution overnight but to progressively redirect a growing share of the budget toward these broader and more effective investments, while keeping targeted, verified input support for farmers who need it most.

Conclusion

Nigeria's fertiliser distribution habit is popular precisely because it is visible, immediate, and politically simple to deliver. All these qualities have nothing to do with whether it actually solves food insecurity. A genuine rethink means treating the fertiliser bag as one input among several, not the centrepiece of the strategy. We must redirect the political energy currently spent on flag-off ceremonies toward building the credit systems, irrigation networks, extension services, and storage infrastructure Nigerian farmers have been asking for all along. The season to question this ritual, rather than simply repeating it, is now.